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THE LIMITS OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION
THEORY IN LEGAL ANALYSIS:
THE CASE OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Robert A. Hillmant
Traditional legal scholarship generally involves the analysis of a
set of judicial opinions to determine whether appellate courts have
applied legal norms consistently, fairly, and logically. Often an analyst
will call for a new approach to a problem based on the author's view
of the applicable law's nature and functions. Traditional scholarship
rarely brings to bear perspectives from the social sciences or other
disciplines. Rather, traditional analysis depends on value judgments
about what constitutes effective and fair law and policy.
At least partly in reaction to the perceived tunnel vision and sub-
jectivity of traditional analysis,' legal writers have turned with enthusi-
asm to other disciplines to broaden their perspective. Economic
analysis of law is, of course, the predominant example of legal ana-
lysts' turn to social science. By utilizing economic principles to ex-
plain and predict legal norms, the economic approach presents a
largely unified, objective perspective on what the law is and what it
should be.
2
Notwithstanding the success of economic analysis of law, critics
maintain that the approach is itself narrow and unrealistic. For exam-
ple, critics assert that neoclassical economic analysis assumes too nar-
rowly that a rational desire to "maximize welfare" as measured by an
increase in wealth motivates people's decisions.3 Even some legal writ-
t Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Kevin Clermont, Larry
DiMatteo, Jim Henderson, and Jeff Rachlinski offered many very helpful comments on
earlier drafts. Thanks also to Forrest Alogna, Cynthia Quimby, and Milena Sterio for excel-
lent research assistance. Heather Hillman andJessica Hillman ably researched sources in
cognitive psychology.
1 These criticisms of traditional legal analysis are, of course, debatable. In fact, the
conclusions this paper draws in part suggest the continued vitality of this mode of analysis.
2 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN & RIcHARD A. PosNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRAar LAW 1-5 (1979).
3 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrS 762 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that tradi-
tional economic theory "presupposes rational parties that strive to maximize their own
welfare"). According to neoclassical economic analysis, voluntary exchange occurs in a
free market because each party values what she receives more than what she gives up. See
id.; RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-11 (4th ed. 1992). Such exchange
increases "allocative efficiency," because it moves resources to "higher valued uses." FARNS-
WORTH, supra, at 762; see also POSNER, supra at 11 (stating that "[w] hen resources are being
used where their value is highest, we may say that they are being used efficiently"). By
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ers who employ neoclassical economic analysis admit that this assump-
tion ignores the complexities and contradictions of human behavior.
Nevertheless, these analysts usually maintain that the simplifying as-
sumptions of their models still allow for accurate evaluation and
prediction.
4
Always resourceful, legal scholars are turning enthusiastically to
another social science that enriches the analysis of human decision
making, called behavioral decision theory (BDT).5 This discipline
seeks to explain and predict people's decisions and to account for
their propensity when making decisions to depart from the predic-
tions of the wealth-maximization principle. 6
Although the turn to BDT will undoubtedly enrich and improve
legal analysis, one purpose of this Essay is to urge caution and to iden-
tify some of the limits of the analysis as applied to law. In employing
BDT, legal writers face the following dilemma: As a whole, BDT ex-
plains that human behavior is complex and contradictory. Taken this
broadly, BDT is not likely to contribute very successfully to instrumen-
tal legal reform, which, of course, requires understanding the prob-
able effect of law on human behavior. Alternatively, if legal theorists
focus too narrowly on particular behavioral observations, their analysis
will be no more realistic than predictions based on economic analy-
sis's wealth-maximization precept. Can legal writers find the appropri-
ate middle ground?
I evaluate the latter question by pursuing the second purpose of
this Essay. I want to discuss a great paradox in contract law. Based on
society's respect for individual freedom, its moral view that people
should keep their promises, and its perspective that private exchange
best allocates and distributes resources, freedom of contract enjoys a
predominant role as a justificatory principle of contract law.7 Con-
tract law allows parties to agree on contract terms as they choose and,
in the absence of demonstrable market failures such as unequal bar-
gaining power or concrete infirmities such as diminished capacity,
pursuing their own self-interest, people benefit society. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (Edwin Carman ed., Modern Library 1937) (1791) (introducing the "invisible
hand" that promotes the good of society); see also KRONMAN & POsNER, supra note 2, at 2
(noting that contractual exchange increases society's wealth). Scholars have also criticized
neoclassical economic analysis of law for accepting existing wealth distribution as its start-
ing point, assuming perfect information and the lack of monopolies, and ignoring trans-
action costs and third-party effects. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CoNTRAcT
LAW 215-17 (1997) (noting criticisms).
4 See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 3, at 16-17.
5 See generally Cass R Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1997) (discussing behavioral research and its implications for law and policy). This disci-
pline actually has a number of names. See id. at 1175 n.1.
6 See id. at 1175 ("Cognitive errors and motivational distortions may press behavior
far from anticipated directions. .. ").
7 See HILLMAN, supra note 3, at 9-12.
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evaluates the validity of their choices largely based on their objective
manifestation of assent.8 Courts operating within this conceptual
framework rarely intercede in parties' agreements to test the ade-
quacy of consideration.9
On the other hand, courts readily impinge on freedom of con-
tract when assessing the validity of agreed (also called liquidated)
damages clauses. Regardless of the quality of bargaining and the type
of parties, if a court determines that an agreed damages provision is a
"penalty," the court will refuse to enforce the provision.10 Why do
judges single out liquidated damages provisions for special treatment?
Can BDT help resolve this question?" Does the theory suggest the
correct judicial approach to liquidated damages?
Part I of this Essay provides a brief overview of BDT. Part II
presents the mystery of why courts single out liquidated damages for
special treatment. Part III evaluates the extent to which the applica-
tion of BDT sheds light on the judicial approach to liquidated dam-
ages. The Essay concludes that BDT contributes to the analysis of
liquidated damages, but the theory comprises only part of the story.
The more general lesson is that BDT is more successful at illustrating
the limitations of a narrow conception of human behavior in legal
analysis than at cultivating a positive or normative theory of the law.
I
BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY
BDT consists of the study of how people utilize information and
create preferences. 12 The theory focuses on people's limited capacity
to gather and process information, their use of "mental shortcuts" or
heuristics to help them do so, and their biases in making decisions. 13
The widespread presence of these phenomena in decision making ex-
8 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 116-19.
9 Exceptions to this general rule include unconscionable bargaining improprieties,
severe information deficiencies, lack of capacity, and important impingements on public
policy. See id.
10 See infra Part II.
11 Professor Melvin Eisenberg has applied BDT to the issue of liquidated damages as
part of a longer article illustrating the use of cognitive psychology in analyzing contract
law. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 211, 225-36 (1995). Here, I focus solely on liquidated damages and expand the BDT
discussion to include questions about its functions and limits when applied to legal issues.
12 See Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice, 95 PSYCHOL
REv. 371, 371 (1988).
13 See Robert E. Scott, Eror and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking. An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 329,
333-34 n.10 (1986) ("Cognitive psychology... specifically examines internal processes,




plains why people often fail to make rational decisions, 14 in the sense
that their decisions fail to conform to the wealth-maximization goal.15
Although the list of decision-making techniques, heuristics, and biases
that constitute BDT is long, in this short synopsis I will focus only on
those that have a clear impact on the debate about liquidated
damages.
A. Bounded Rationality
In order to make a decision, people must collect and process in-
formation. Each of these steps involves costs "in the form of time,
energy, and perhaps money."'1 6 People rarely choose to invest in a
complete search for information, although this decision may be per-
fectly rational in light of the costs and benefits involved.
The concept of bounded rationality involves people's limited use
of the information they have gathered to make decisions. 17 The
human capability to process information is bounded by "limitations of
computational ability, ability to calculate consequences, ability to or-
ganize and utilize memory, and the like."' 8 In light of the cost of
information searches and bounded rationality, people tend to "econo-
mize to some degree on information" 9 and, in the aggregate, make
decisions that are "good enough"-the most appropriate decisions
given the information available and the limitations of the decision
maker2°-rather than "optimal" ones that would maximize their
welfare. 21
14 See id. at 335 (noting that " [t]here is mounting social science evidence that individ-
uals make systematic errors in their cognitive judgments and decisions"); see also CHRISTINA
LEE, ALTERNATIVES TO COGNITION 81 (1998) (asserting that "the approach to rationality
taken by heuristics and biases literature" suggests that "human beings are not particularly
good at thinking rationally").
-5 See Scott, supra note 13, at 330 (noting that people's decisions stray from a "theoret-
ical conception of ideal rationality"). For a brief discussion of the wealth maximization
principle, see supra note 3.
16 Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 214.
17 See Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition,
69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 141 (1998) (relying on 1 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONA.ITY (1982)).
18 Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 214.
19 Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of ConsequentialDamages: Default Theory
and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 391-94 (1998) (discussing bounded rationality).
20 Garvin, supra note 17, at 142, n.327.
21 Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 214. Herbert Simon first called this phenomenon
"satisficing." See Garvin, supra note 17, at 141. Theorists debate whether decisions are
"randomly wrong" and therefore, "over time, yield a balanced result" or whether "con-
tracting part[ies consistently] err on one side when estimating risk or responding to infor-
mation." Id. at 142. If the latter is true, then wealth maximization will not reliably predict
outcomes. See id.
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B. Availability Heuristic
Because of people's limited willingness and capacity to process
information, 22 they simplify decision making by adopting heuristics.
Heuristics consist of "mental shortcuts" for processing information
23
that "reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predict-
ing values to simpler judgmental operations."24 Often helpful,25
heuristics nevertheless cause systematic mistakes and create irrational
biases.26
Instead of attempting to determine from the pertinent facts the
objective probability of an event's occurrence, for example, people
simplify the processing of information by drawing on their memories
and experiences.2 7 This "availability" heuristic leads to error because
people tend to remember more vividly recent dramatic events (even if
rare) than "drab" ones (even if common).28 They mistakenly believe
that events that come to mind easily are more likely to occur than
events that present a greater challenge to their imaginations.2 9 For
example, people tend to overestimate the possibility of contracting a
particular disease if family members or friends suffer from it.a°
C. Framing and Endowment Effects
"Framing" involves the manner in which people describe and
present choices.3' Choice description and presentation can affect
how people evaluate data, thereby producing a "framing effect."3 2 For
22 See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 216.
23 See George Loewenstein et al., Seif-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargain-
ing, 22J. LEGA.L STUD. 135, 140 (1993) (stating that heuristics are "cognitive rules of thumb
that are naturally adapted to limited human information-processing capabilities").
24 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
25 See id,
26 See id. at 20.
27 See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 220-21; see also Garvin, supra note 17, at 146 (assert-
ing that "vivid memories may color our recollections too garishly, distorting our percep-
tions and ... our analyses"); Garvin, supra note 19, at 406 (noting that "people tend to
overvalue their own experience in assessing risk").
28 Garvin, supra note 19, at 399; see also Garvin, supra note 17, at 147 (asserting that
"silence may breed overoptimism, as quietude, filtered through availability, yields too low
an estimate of risk"); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (arguing that "the frequency of some event is estimated by
judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type").
29 See Timur Kuran & Cass PR Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683, 685, 706 (1999). "While underestimating dangers that are not highly
publicized (heart disease, strokes, asthma), [people] grossly overestimate risks to which the
media pay a great deal of attention (accidents, electrocution)." Id. at 707.
30 See id. at 706.
31 Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 218-19.
32 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 705.
20001
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example, people think of the status quo ante as a reference point
when determining whether an event is a gain or a loss. Therefore,
"losses are understood as such by reference to existing distributions
and practices." 33 People can "manipulate the frame" so that a loss
appears as a gain or vice versa, such as when a business offers a "cash
discount" instead of a "credit card surcharge." 34 Professor Sunstein
points out the significance of such manipulation: "'Alternative de-
scriptions of the same choice problems lead to systematically different
preferences ... and the preference between x and y often depends on
the choice set in which they are embedded.'"3
The "endowment effect" is closely related to the framing effect.
3 6
According to the endowment effect, people value goods they own
more than identical goods that belong to others.3 7 For example,
when people sell their property, they treat the sale as a loss "relative to
their current endowments. '38 People therefore demand more to sell
something they own than they would be willing to spend to purchase
it:3 9 "[P]eople who own hard-to-come-by sports tickets do not part
with them, although they would be disinclined to pay the same
amount to acquire them afresh."40 The endowment effect therefore
directly conflicts with the economic principle that a person's "maxi-
mum willingness to pay for a good should equal his minimum sale
price."41
People also exhibit "loss aversion" behavior, which means they
dislike losses more than they are "pleased with equivalent gains"42 and
they will "sacrifice more to avoid losses than to obtain gains of a simi-
lar magnitude."43 In addition, people disfavor out-of-pocket costs
33 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1180.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1176 (quoting Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE
RA-IONAL FOUNDATIONS OF EcONOMIc BEHAVIOR 185, 186 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1996)). "[F]raming effects very much influence judgments about whether a measure con-
stitutes a subsidy or a penalty." Id. at 1181.
36 Id. at 1185.
37 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski & ForestJourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1551 (1998).
38 David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment
at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 975, 1009 (1998).
39 See id.; Rachlinski &Jourden, supra note 37, at 1551; see alsoJennifer Arlen, Com-
ment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAN, D. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1998)
(providing a concrete example of the endowment effect).
40 Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1729, 1734 (1998).
41 Arlen, supra note 39, at 1771.
42 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1179; see also Arlen, supra note 39, at 1771 (concluding
that loss aversion "exists when the disutility associated with giving up an object is greater
than the utility gained by acquiring it, even when there are no wealth effects").
43 Rachlinski &Jourden, supra note 37, at 1556.
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more than opportunity costs.44 All of these phenomena tend to show
that people generally prefer the status quo over change.4
5
D. Hindsight Bias
Biases in decision making come in all shapes and sizes. Perhaps
the most widely discussed and intuitively understood example is the
"hindsight bias": People "overstate the predictability of past events."46
Once they learn of an event, they believe it was more likely to occur
than before they received the information. 47 People therefore "be-
lieve that others should have been able to anticipate events much bet-
ter than was actually the case."4 8 Although people understand their
susceptibility to the "hindsight bias," as shown in common admoni-
tions such as "hindsight vision is 20/20" and "don't be a Monday
morning quarterback, '49 they almost invariably fall into its clutches. 50
E. Overconfidence
People are generally too confident. 51 They are willing to accept
too much risk based on their belief that adverse low-probability risks
will not occur.52 For example, people believe "they are less likely than
others to be subject to automobile accidents, infection from AIDS,
heart attacks, asthma, and many other health risks."53 Once people
make a decision, they are especially likely to downplay risks54 and to
become overconfident about their decisions. 55 Among other things,
44 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1179.
45 See Arlen, supra note 39, at 1772; MiUon, supra note 38, at 1009.
46 JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. Ci.
L. REV. 571, 571 (1998).
47 See id. at 580 (arguing that "'[fuinding out that an outcome has occurred increases
its perceived likelihood'" (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, HindsightfForesight: The Effect of Out-
come Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYcHOL. 288, 297
(1975))).
48 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Reflections on Historical Judg-
ment, in NEw DIRECTIONS FOR METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE: FALLIBLE
JUDGMENT IN BEHAVIORAL REsEARcH (R Schweder & D. Fiske eds., 1980), quoted in Ward
Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 225, 243 (1986).
49 Rachlinski, supra note 46, at 571.
50 For an excellent explanation of the possible causes of the hindsight bias, see id. at
582-86.
51 See Garvin, supra note 19, at 404.
52 See Garvin, supra note 17, at 151 (noting that people "assign too great a weight to
relatively probable events and too low a weight to relatively improbable events"); Garvin,
supra note 19, at 406; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1178.
53 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1183; see also Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis
of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VA N. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (concluding that "people
are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability that bad things will happen to
them").
54 See Garvin, supra note 17, at 148 n.362.
55 See id. at 150.
2000] 723
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this approach reduces the discomfort or "cognitive dissonance" that
they feel about their decisions. 56 Similarly, people generally have an
inflated view of their own capabilities and therefore downplay risks
they believe they can control.
57
Notwithstanding evidence of overconfidence, people tend to
overestimate the chance of "available" risks.58 Available risks include
recent events that have received lots of publicity59 or affect them di-
rectly. As an example of the latter, recall that people tend to overesti-
mate the likelihood of contracting a disease from which a family
member or friend suffers.
60
F. Ambiguity Aversion
People prefer certainty over ambiguity and make choices to avoid
uncertainty. 6' They choose certain results over gambles, even when
the latter are superior based on the law of probability.62 For example,
people generally would prefer to receive a guaranteed gain of £3000
over "an eighty percent chance of gaining £4000."63 When faced with
unavoidable risk, people "prefer situations of risk (in which probabili-
ties can be assigned to outcomes) over situations of uncertainty (in
which probabilities cannot be assigned)."64
G. Fairness Orientation
Social psychologists have shown that people seek to act fairly and
to cooperate, and want others to perceive this behavior.65 These ten-
dencies may trump the pursuit of self-interest.66 Relatedly, people
prefer roughly equivalent exchanges, in terms of both quantity and
56 See Garvin, supra note 19, at 400-03.
57 See Arlen, supra note 39, at 1773.
58 Jolls et al., supra note 28, at 1518.
59 See Arlen, supra note 39, at 1781.
60 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 706; supra notes 27-30 and accompanying
text.
61 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 707; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1191; see also
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am. PsYcHoLOGisr 341,
341 (1984) (stating that "[a] large majority of people prefer the sure thing over the gam-
ble, although the gamble has higher (mathematical) expectation").
62 See Garvin, supra note 19, at 407.
63 Id. The latter is worth £3200 based on the law of probability.
64 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1191; see also Garvin, supra note 19, at 365 n.141 (stating
that "risk consists of future states in which the outcomes, though unknown, follow a known
distribution, while uncertainty consists of those future states for which the distributions are
also unknown").
65 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1186; Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1747, 1755 (1998).
66 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1186-87.
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type.67 Social psychologists deem this "rule of reciprocity" as "essen-
tial to the well being of society."68 The rule of reciprocity predicts that
people will reject unfair bargains even when they would benefit from
the exchange. 69 People are also averse to imposing penalties on




THE MYSTERY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
In theory, at the time of contracting, parties can agree on the
amount of a promisor's damages liability in the event that the prom-
isor breaks the contract.7 2 By including an agreed damages provision
in the contract, contracting parties reduce the cost of contract break-
down by eliminating the expense of calculating damages 73 and by re-
ducing the likelihood of litigation.74 In addition, a liquidated
damages clause ensures a promisee a recovery when the promisee
cannot prove damages with sufficient certainty.75 Moreover, liqui-
dated damages impress on promisors the importance of perform-
ance and create incentives for the promisor to perform.76 Concomit-
67 See KENNETH J. GERGEN & MARY M. GERGEN, SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 288-92 (2d ed.
1986). "In an equitable exchange, each person's relative rewards and costs are equal. In-
equity is uncomfortable, and people often try to restore equity." Id. at 292.
68 Id. at 288.
69 See Arlen, supra note 39, at 1775.
70 N.T. Feather, Reactions to Penalties for an Offense in Relation to Authoritarianism, Val-
ues, Perceived Responsibility, Perceived Seriousness, and Deservingness, 71 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 572-73 (1996); see also Steven J. Stroessner & Larry B. Heuer, Cognitive Bias in
Procedural Justice: Formation and Implications of Illusory Correlations in Perceived Intergroup Fair-
ness, 71 J. PERSONALrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 717 (1996).
71 See Ellen Berscheid & Elaine Walster, When Does a Harm-Doer Compensate a Victim, 6
J. PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCHOL 435, 436 (1967) (contending that "people feel others
should get exactly what they deserve, no more and no less").
72 See, e.g., Scott M. Tyler, Note, No (Easy) Way Out: "Liquidating" Stipulated Damages for
Contractor Delay in Public Construction Contracts, 44 DuKE LJ. 357, 357 (1994).
73 See Leeber v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452, 455 (Me. 1988); FARNSwORTH, supra
note 3, at 841.
74 See Leeber, 546 A.2d at 455; FARNSwORTH, supra note 3, at 841.
75 SeeFARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 841, 846 (mentioning the enforceability of agreed
damages for breaking a covenant not to compete because damages are too uncertain);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L.
REv. 554, 557 (1977).
76 See Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Comment, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real
Estate Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMORY LJ. 267, 284
(1990) (asserting that liquidated damages provisions control risk); Matthew T. Furton,
Note, The Use of Penalty Clauses in Location Incentive Agreements, 70 IND. L.J. 1009, 1018-19
(1995). But if the incentive is too obvious and compels performance when the promisor's
best interest is to break the contract, a court may not enforce the provision because the
court views the provision as a penalty. See, e.g., Mason v. Fakhimi, 865 P.2d 333, 335 (Nev.
20001
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antly, they signal to the promisee the promisor's willingness to per-
form.
7 7
In reality, courts often overturn liquidated damages clauses as
"penalties," with greater zeal and vigor than they strike other contract
terms.78 Courts will deem a term a "penalty" if it calls for damages
that bear no reasonable relation to the forecast of actual damages. 79
Courts also strike damages provisions as penalties if, at the time of
contracting, it appeared that a court would have little difficulty ascer-
taining actual damages in the event of a breach.80 Courts also police
liquidated damages provisions based on actual outcomes. Unable to
resist interceding when actual damages turn out to be disproportion-
ate to an agreed remedies clause, many courts invalidate such clauses
as penalties.81
The mystery is why courts are so willing to police agreed damages
when they are so reticent to interfere with other contract provisions.8 2
Courts and commentators offer several explanations related to either
the substance of agreed damages provisions, the bargaining process
that produced them, or both. None of these explanations seems
wholly satisfactory. For example, some analysts explain the modern
judicial antipathy for agreed damages provisions as a holdover from
the equity court's practice of refusing to enforce penal bonds,83 in
which a party promised to pay a certain sum if that party broke a con-
tract.84 The equity court believed that contract remedies were
designed to compensate the injured party for the loss, not to punish
1993) ("[A] penalty is for the purpose of securing performance .... " (quoting 22 Am. JUR.
2D Damages § 684 (1980))); FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 841.
77 See Furton, supra note 76, at 1022.
78 See Coopersmith, supra note 76, at 275 (presuming liquidated damages "to be a
penalty" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see DJ Mfg. Corp. v.
United States, 86 F.3d 1130,' 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (asserting that "federal law 'does not
look with disfavor upon liquidated damages provisions in contracts'" (quoting Priebe &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947))).
79 See H.M.O. Sys., Inc. v. Choicecare Health Servs., Inc., 665 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983).
80 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 844-45; Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 230-32.
81 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 845; Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 232.
82 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 841 (stating that "[c ompared with the extensive
power that contracting parties have to bargain over their substantive contract rights and
duties, their power to bargain over their remedial rights is surprisingly limited").
83 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACr 119-25 (1975);
William H. Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, 29 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121-23 (1915); see also Goetz
& Scott, supra note 75, at 593 (stating that "[slince the roots of the penalty rule were
nourished on fairness concerns, it is not surprising that generations of lawyers have clung
to the view that penalties are 'bad'").
84 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 842. The modem approach to enforcement of
agreed damages began around 1670. See SIMPSON, supra note 83, at 121.
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or coerce the breaching party into performing, even when the parties
had agreed to the penal bond precisely for those latter purposes.
85
Modem courts apparently have greeted with open arms the eq-
uity court's response to penal bonds. Indeed, courts now seem to
have a curiously heightened sensitivity to any agreed damages provi-
sion, whether penal or not. Courts have also accepted the equity
court's estimation of the coercive and punitive effect of penal bonds
without seriously investigating the accuracy and validity of that posi-
tion. Whether courts should consider an agreed remedy that is in-
commensurate with actual damages to be punitive and coercive,
however, depends on the nature of the bargaining that produced the
clause. After all, if the promisee paid a premium for an agreed dam-
ages provision that is greater than actual damages and the promisor
understood the significance of agreeing to the term, 'Just compensa-
tion" arguably would entail enforcing the provision. 6 In fact, in the
context of fair bargaining between business people, courts sometimes
find palatable (and enforceable) provisions that amount to penalties,
such as "take or pay" contracts in which purchasers of natural gas
agree to pay regardless of whether they take the gas.87
Modem courts therefore reinforce their antipathy to penalties by
finding the bargaining process deficient.88 For example, courts gen-
eralize that parties do not negotiate agreed remedies provisions.8 9 In-
stead, courts believe that promisors share an "'illusion[ ] of hope"'
that nothing will go wrong90 and consequently fail to bargain ade-
quately over remedial provisions. But even if this is an empirically
accurate and otherwise persuasive explanation, why have courts sin-
gled out liquidated damages provisions for special treatment on this
ground? For example, why do courts fail to police the parties' pur-
ported allocation of risk of unanticipated but calamitous circum-
85 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 841 n.3 (citing Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123
(1858)); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 75, at 561 (stating that parties should not be able
to recover more than "just compensation," even if bargained for).
86 Although courts pay lip service to freedom of contract between equal partners, the
liquidated damages test always has included a limitation based on "just compensation":
"There is no sound reason why persons competent and free to contract may not agree
upon this subject as fully as upon any other, or why their agreement, when fairly and un-
derstandingly entered into with a view to just compensation for the anticipated loss, should not
be enforced." Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361, 365 (1919) (emphasis added).
87 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 848.
88 See, e.g., Monsen Eng'g Co. v. Tami-Githens, Inc., 530 A.2d 313, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987).
89 Courts fail to assume that "parties have capitalized the risk of breach and included
this value in the price." Phillip R. Kaplan, Note, A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liqui-
dated Damages, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1072 (1977).




stances with the same vigor to determine whether the parties were too
optimistic that nothing would go wrong?
In addition, courts apparently believe that promisors are pecu-
liarly susceptible to being coerced into agreeing to penalty provi-
sions.91 Little evidence from actual cases supports this assertion 92 and
nothing about the nature of agreed remedies explains why promisees
would have more leverage with respect to these clauses than any other
clause. 93
Another alleged deficiency in the bargaining process with respect
to agreed remedies is "the limits of cognition" of contracting parties
in this context.94 Professor Eisenberg asserts that although parties can
easily understand terms "such as subject matter, quantity, and price,"
they cannot comprehend "the scenarios of breach" and the "applica-
tion of a liquidated damages provision" to these scenarios.95 In addi-
tion, parties discount the probability of breach based on a cost-benefit
analysis tainted by optimism about performance. 96 For these reasons,
parties may fail to focus on liquidated damages provisions when agree-
ing to a contract, thereby supplying courts with ajustification for scru-
tinizing these provisions more closely.
As with the other explanations for the policing of liquidated dam-
ages, the "limits of cognition" approach depends on the speculative
assertion that parties' planning and bargaining of liquidated damages
provisions are less effective than their planning and bargaining of
other provisions. Professor Eisenberg's "limits of cognition" explana-
tion, along with other explanations that take into account aspects of
cognition, more generally raise the issue of BDT's appropriate role in
explaining and improving law. We now turn to this subject. Does the
91 See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 226-27.
92 See id. at 225-26; Goetz & Scott, supra note 75, at 592; see also DJ Mfg. Corp. v.
United States, 86 F.3d 1130, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (asserting that parties should be free to
agree to liquidated damages clauses as with any other contract term).
93 Some theorists explain and support courts' enthusiastic policing of liquidated dam-
ages provisions on the basis of economic efficiency. But whether the efficient strategy
would allow penalty provisions or strike them is subject to debate. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH,
supra note 3, at 938 n.14 (citing the opposing views of Goetz and Scott, and Clarkson,
Miller, and Muris). Based on the goal of maximizing wealth and taking into account the
theory of efficient breach, a legal economist would ask whether the net gain from a regime
that enforces penalties (which would typically require the promisor to incur the cost of
obtaining a release from the promisee before substituting a third party for greater profits)
exceeds the net gain from an approach that strikes penalties (which would allow the prom-
isor to breach the contract with the promisee in order to substitute a third party for greater
profits, but which would typically entail the cost of litigation to compensate the promisee).
See gentrally William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DuKE L.J. 629,
633 (1999) (arguing that "punitive damages should be available for all willful breaches of
contract").
94 Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 227.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 227-28.
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theory really shed light on the mystery of liquidated damages? Does
BDT suggest appropriate reform?
III
BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY AND CoNTRACr LAW
By identifying and reporting many cognitive biases, heuristics,
and limitations,97 BDT suggests that human behavior is complex and
contradictory98 and that the wealth-maximization baseline of eco-
nomic analysis is too facile. Do cognitive theories tell us anything else
that can be helpful to legal analysis? Can the theories help suggest
new legal rules? In seeking to answer these questions, this Part investi-
gates and evaluates BDT's contribution to the problem of liquidated
damages.
A. Behavioral Decision Theory's Relevance to Contract Law
Issues
Although controversial, for purposes of discussion, I will assume
the accuracy and reliability of the laboratory studies that find deficien-
cies in the manner that people process information and reach deci-
sions.99 Assuming that people generally act in conformity with the
97 See LEE, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that "a bewildering array of mutually contradic-
tory models of human choices and human behavior exists, and a large literature is dedi-
cated to the comparison, revision, integration, and disintegration of these models across
an enormous range of behavioral domains").
98 See id. at 79 (stating that "[h]uman behavior is no more and no less than a complex
physical system").
99 For a discussion of the possible shortcomings of these studies, see Russell
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CoRNrELL L. REv. 608, 661
(1998), and authorities cited therein. See also LEE, supra note 14, at 57 (concluding that
"[i] t is clear that models of human behavior based on the completion of questionnaires are
less than ideal"); id. at 122 (asserting that psychologists should understand the "political
assumptions that underlie their work"); Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 48, at 270
(discussing studies "done under conditions of low motivation and attention and without
the use of tools").
A more broadside criticism of cognitive theory is based on its focus on individual deci-
sion theory: "[C]ollectively [cognitive] findings . .. say nothing about the social dimen-
sions of information acquisition, retrieval, processing, and transmission, and they disregard
the social mechanisms that shape risk judgments and preferences." Kuran & Sunstein,
supra note 29, at 710. Christina Lee argues that "[miodern psychology's focus on individ-
ual cognition, its much heralded 'cognitive revolution,' reifies cognition and artificially
separates it from the person, and the person from the broader physical and social context."
LEE, supra note 14, at vii. For example, "[t] he assumption that cognition is always prior to
emotion is open to empirical challenge." Id. at 57; see also id. at 95 (pointing out argu-
ments in favor of "contextualist theories"). According to critics, cognitive psychology ig-
nores the interaction between emotion and cognition, the role of subconscious cognition,
and ramifications of culture on cognition. See id. at 81, 99-101. Critics lament scholars'
focus on cognition at the expense of a broader contextual analysis as the logical culmina-
tion of an unsuccessful effort to present psychology as a coherent science. See id. at 2
(arguing that "psychology's contemporary emphasis on the cognitive has inhibited the de-
velopment of alternative approaches to our subject matter"). In the alternative,
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predictions of behavioral experiments, what conclusions should legal
analysts draw?100 What hurdles exist for both the descriptive and pre-
scriptive use of BDT in contract law?
Legal analysts must clarify the extent to which particular cogni-
tive processes actually occur in the exchange setting. For example, ana-
lysts debate whether contract default rules, such as the award of
expectancy damages, enjoy an endowment effect.1 1 Perhaps parties
at the bargaining stage view expectancy damages as an entitlement
and therefore value that remedy more than other remedial alterna-
tives such as liquidated damages. 10 2 On the other hand, neither party
really "owns" the right to expectancy damages until the parties enter a
contract and one party breaches. As a result, the endowment effect
may not apply.'03
Before legal analysts rely on behavioral studies, they also need to
obtain or develop data based on simulations of decision making in the
full range of contractual transactions. For example, the parties may
absorb and process information about the importance of a liquidated
damages provision very differently, depending upon whether they are
experienced business people, business novices, or individuals making
a formal or informal agreement. The parties' perceptions of liqui-
dated damages may be very different, for example, depending on
whether they recently experienced a contract breakdown and judicial
enforcement (or rejection) of such a provision. Whether the parties
have an interest in a long-term relationship as opposed to a one-shot
deal also probably influences their perceptions of agreed damages.
For example, parties who have invested in long-term relations may dis-
count information that would make them feel insecure.' 0 4 No single
description of cognitive processes can either fully explain the legal
approach to agreed damages or prescribe the law that should apply to
all exchange transactions.10 5
"[c] ontextualist behavioralism... increases the focus on the role of environmental stimuli
in evoking behavior." Id. at 117.
100 For a discussion in one context, see Korobkin, supra note 99, at 631.
101 See id.; Millon, supra note 38, at 1010-17.
102 See generally Korobkin, supra note 99, at 612 (stating that "contracting parties view
default terms as part of the status quo, and they prefer the status quo to alternative states").
103 Compare Millon, supra note 38, at 1010 (asserting that "contractual default rules
themselves do not create entitlements"), with Korobkin, supra note 99, at 631 ("The highly
contingent nature of contract default rules means that such rules do not provide actual
endowments, but only what might be termed 'illusory endowments." (citations omitted)).
104 See Garvin, supra note 19, at 401-02.
105 In his companion paper, Professor Rachlinski asserts that "attention to context has
always been an important part of BDT." JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New"Law and Psychology:
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CoRNmLL L. Rxv. 739, 744 (2000). But
he supports current law's curious (and mandatory) approach to liquidated damages based
on the broad generalization that contracting parties are overoptimistic. See id. at 760-63.
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Not only can disparate contexts lead to different cognitions, but
each party to a particular transaction may have different motivations,
experiences, practices, and goals.106 Certainly, each party's outlook
can influence the way that party receives and processes information.
For example, different levels of experience may lead to conflicting
views of the likelihood of contract default and of the probability that a
court will enforce an agreed damages provision. If one party has en-
joyed great success in avoiding contract breakdowns and is therefore
too optimistic about the outcome of the current transaction, but the
other party, fresh from a broken deal, overestimates the possibility of
default, it is not self-evident which party the law of agreed damages
should favor.
B. The Problem of Conflicting Lessons
Even if behavioral phenomena generally occur in contractual set-
tings-for example, contracting parties are too optimistic or prefer
the status quo-do such observations explain the content of legal
rules or suggest improvements in the law? BDT may be of only limited
help because its theorists have not yet developed guiding principles
from the plethora of observations about behavior.
0 7
Consider liquidated damages. Because people accumulate, un-
derstand, and process only a limited amount of information about the
future, contracting parties may fail to comprehend and focus on the
prospect of breach.'08 Because people are too optimistic, even con-
tracting parties with perfect information about breach may still as-
sume the success of their venture and sacrifice the detailed bargaining
necessary to achieve an effective liquidated damages provision.'0 9 Be-
cause people dislike uncertainty and "suppress information that
would yield inconsistency,"' " 0 contracting parties endeavoring to cre-
ate and perform an agreement may assume the ultimate success of the
project and discount inconsistent information about the prospect of
106 See Garvin, supra note 19, at 389. See generallyJon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1422,
1424-26 (1999) (discussing how the dominant party in a transaction can manipulate the
other party's cognition and decisions).
107 See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353, 380 (1988) (stating that "[p]sychologists... have... a large set of observa-
tions about how experimental subjects behave"); see also LEE, supra note 14, at 16 (arguing
that "[cognitive] models are useless in understanding or predicting behavior, although
they may be seductive ways of talking about that behavior aftenvards"); Hanson & Kysar,
supra note 106, at 1427 (arguing that "behavioral research presents too many conflicting
and overlapping biases to make confident overall predictions about consumer
perceptions").
108 See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 227.
109 See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
110 Garvin, supra note 17, at 148 n.362.
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default. Because people desire fair exchanges and dislike windfalls
and penalties, contracting parties may disfavor coercive and punitive
agreed damages provisions when they do focus on them.
These cognitive phenomena and the predictions they generate
about contracting parties' decision making both help to explain the
judicial response to liquidated damages provisions and tend to con-
firm the appropriateness of the current aggressive judicial approach
to the issue. The parties view contract breakdown as a remote possi-
bility, fail to focus on it, and, to the extent that they do think about
breach, seek a fair remedial package. Because of the lack of paradig-
matic bargaining with respect to liquidated damages provisions and
because of their potential, due to unanticipated circumstances, to
generate penalties and windfalls contrary to the parties' intentions,
courts do and should enthusiastically police liquidated damages
provisions.
On the other hand, analysts have a sufficient arsenal of behav-
ioral phenomena to mount a convincing campaign in favor of enforc-
ing agreed damages provisions whether or not they satisfy current
tests. For example, assuming that people assess default rules as enti-
tlements, contracting parties should prefer the default remedial posi-
tion-the award of expectancy damages. When parties contract
around this default rule and agree to liquidate damages, the term
must be very important to them. The parties' effort to replace the
default rule suggests that they likely bargained over the provision with
care."'
Contracting parties should focus their bargaining on a liquidated
damages provision for other behavioral reasons as well. Because peo-
ple do not like ambiguity,112 contracting parties may prefer the
"safety" of a liquidated damages provision over the uncertainty of ex-
pectancy damages." 3 Judges who exhibit a hindsight bias, however,
will overestimate the parties' ability to calculate, at the time of con-
tracting, the actual damages that would result from a breach. Because
judges will believe that the parties' remedial situation at the time of
contracting was not ambiguous, judges will undervalue the impor-
tance the parties attach to their agreed damages provision. This sug-
gests that courts should presume the enforceability of such provisions
rather than make every effort to strike them.
111 Cf Korobkin, supra note 99, at 673 (asserting that tailored default rules avoid status
quo bias).
112 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
113 Cf Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1191 (arguing that "[if] people are averse to ambigui-
ties, they may produce an incoherent pattern of regulation ... that some things are 'safe'
and others are 'dangerous'").
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The parties' focus on achieving a "fair" exchange and their aver-
sion to windfalls and penalties also may point to enforcement of
agreed remedies. These attitudes may attenuate the parties' tendency
to discount the importance of remedial provisions and may motivate
them to uncover potential unintended consequences of their reme-
dial approach and to account for them in the contract.
Finally, parties can "frame" their agreed damages provision so
that a court is unlikely to call it a penalty. For example, a seller of
goods can offer a discount for early payment instead of a penalty for
late payment, even though the two strategies achieve the same re-
sult.114 The ease with which parties can manipulate their agreed rem-
edies provision suggests that the dichotomy between penalties and
liquidated damages lacks substance, and simply results from a framing
bias of judges.
C. Behavioral Decision Theory's Ambiguous Normative Position
Even if BDT coherently applies to contract law, the appropriate
strategy for lawmakers still remains elusive. Lawmakers must consider
whether and how to accommodate cognitive shortcomings. For exam-
ple, should the law excuse parties' failure to process information or
attempt to change their behavior? Have judges intuited behavioral
shortcomings, even without the benefit of a formalized analysis, so
that the law already appropriately accommodates biases? How do
legal positions based on people's cognitive limitations affect other
legal policy goals?
Basing the content of law on BDT may be particularly challenging
to lawmakers. For example, if both parties irrationally discount the
probability of breakdown and therefore pay less attention to their liq-
uidated damages clause at the bargaining stage, it is not self-evident
that the clause should be thrown out. Notwithstanding their lack of
care, the parties still expressed a preference for liquidated damages
over default expectancy damages and may have made explicit or im-
plicit trade-offs based on that decision. Generally, overturning con-
tract terms based on the degree of attention the parties paid to them
seems too blunderbuss an approach to contract enforcement. Parties
should be able to rely on their contract terms, absent deception or
other concrete bargaining infirmities, regardless of the amount of
time they devoted to crafting any particular term.
An even more important question legal analysts face is whether
law based on cognitive limitations will create appropriate incentives.
Law that rarely excuses contracting parties from their objective mani-
114 See Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 92 A. 665, 667 (Conn. 1914); see also supra text
accompanying note 87 (discussing courts' willingness to enforce take-or-pay contracts).
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festations of assent holds them to a higher standard than BDT might
suggest. Nevertheless, objective-assent law creates incentives for par-
ties to maximize their planning and drafting strategies and abilities.' 1 5
Moreover, training and experience improve cognitive abilities over
time." 6 Thus, if courts routinely enforce agreed damages clauses,
parties might become more aware of the seriousness, purpose, and
effect of these provisions. 117 In other words, the appropriate strategy
for dealing with perception problems is not self-evident: Robust law
that encourages communication and planning by holding the parties
to their contract ultimately may be more effective than law that liber-
ally absolves promisors from their obligations.
Because many of the cognitive deficiencies that relate to contract
making are easy to intuit,118 it should not be surprising that current
law to some degree already reflects the realities of how people make
choices.1 9 Judicial criticism of parties' "'illusions of hope"' that noth-
ing will go wrong in agreed damages cases underscores the existing
judicial focus on cognitive processes.120 The challenge for lawmakers,
however, is to determine whether the law already has encompassed all
that BDT has to offer or whether cognitive theory mandates further
115 This assumes, of course, that lack of care in producing an agreed damages clause is
not "hard-wired into us." Ulen, supra note 65, at 1760; cf Edwards & von Wnmterfeldt, supra
note 48, at 271 (suggesting that when lawyers and clients educate each other, they mutually
improve cognition).
116 See Edwards &v on Winterfeldt, supra note 48, at 259; see also ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 699 (1965) (finding that "caution increases with age"); Edwards & von
Winterfeldt, supra note 48, at 270 (concluding that "aids to careful thought severely limit
the productivity of the error producing mechanisms"); Roberta Romano, A Comment on
Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L.
RExv. 313, 313 (1986) (remarking that "cognitive processes are, in fundamental ways,
learned intellectual skills").
117 Attention to incentives in the behavioral calculus is itself fraught with danger. For
example, disclosure law may backfire if its goal is to increase cognition; people may be-
come overloaded with information and make even worse decisions. But see David M.
Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure 59 S.
GL. L. REV. 277, 278-79 (1986) (arguing that disclosure laws do not create "information
overload" problems).
118 See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 48, at 273.
119 For example, Professor Fuller long ago noted the cautionary function of the con-
sideration requirement in contract law. Contract law requires "bargained for considera-
tion" to assure that promisors are sufficiently cautioned about the seriousness and
ramifications of their promise. Contract law therefore already provides a check on parties'
optimism. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 799-802, 806-
07, 812-15 (1941). To cite another example, contract lawmakers have already softened the
duty-to-read requirement in the context of consumer form contracts because of an appreci-
ation for the limited cognition of consumers in the face of an "information overload" and
other cognitive hurdles. Grether et al., supra note 117, at 277-79; see also C &J Fertilizer
Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Iowa 1973) (stating that insured's
reasonable expectations rather than literal contract language govern enforcement of adhe-
sion contract).
120 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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reform. Focusing again on agreed damages, does existing law over-
protect, underprotect, or adequately protect parties from their exces-
sive optimism? The answer to this question is not obvious.
Lawmakers should also consider the impact of rules fashioned to
deal with cognitive limitations on other goals and policies. For exam-
ple, courts could create monumental floodgate problems by acknowl-
edging that they police liquidated damages provisions to account for
parties' general irrationality in processing information. 21 After all,
why should judges single out liquidated damages for this treatment?
What contract term would be safe from this attack? Aggressive use of
this reasoning to question contract enforceability could therefore un-
dermine contract law's goals of certainty and predictability, which may
be better served by the traditional objective theory of assent.
1 22
D. The Problem of the Decision Maker: Judges' Cognitive
Processes
It should be clear by now that the decision-making techniques,
heuristics, and biases that cognitive theory explains apply to decision
makers in the legal system.' 23 How should lawmakers struggling with
liquidated damages take their own cognitive shortcomings into ac-
count, if at all? Because agreed damages law is largely judge-made, I
will focus on judicial cognitive limitations.
First, we have already seen that judges who exhibit a hindsight
bias may overestimate the parties' capacity at the bargaining stage to
calculate the potential damages from a breach. 124 As a result, judges
may ignore the parties' ambiguity aversion and generally undervalue
the importance of the agreed damages provision to the parties. 125
This result suggests that judges should err on the side of overenforce-
121 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1178 (stating that "if people's choices are based on
incorrect judgments, at the time of choice, about what their experience will be after the
choice, there is reason to question whether respect for choices rooted in these incorrect
judgments is a good wvay to promote utility or welfare").
122 See MIcHAELJ. TREBiLcoc, THE LMrrs OF FREEDOM OF CoN'TRAcr 163 (1993). Tre-
bilcock argues that "the case for paternalistic legal interventions on grounds of contingent,
adaptive, or bad preferences becomes much more problematic and the burden ofjustify,-
ing intervention correspondingly much stronger, simply because clearly definable individ-
ual preferences are being repudiated in the absence of readily identifiable forms of
coercion or information failure." Id.; see also id. at 157 ("If the ideas of endogenous prefer-
ences and cognitive distortions are carried sufficiently far, it may be impossible to describe
a truly autonomous preference.... If the notion of autonomy is abandoned, the realm of
permissible legal interferences may become limitless...." (quoting Cass R Sunstein, Legal
Interferences with Private Preferences, 52 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 1129, 1170 (1986))).
123 SeeJolls et al., supra note 28, at 1543 (citing W. Krp Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS 149
(1992)); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 765 (suggesting that "Uludges are subject to
the availability heuristic, vulnerable to informational biases, and responsive to reputational
incentives").




ment of agreed remedies provisions to compensate for their hindsight
bias. Second, we have seen that parties can manipulate the penalty-
liquidated damages distinction based on the manner in which they
frame their agreed damages provision. This suggests that the law
should dispense with this misleading distinction. Third, judges' fair-
ness orientation may cause them to overturn an agreed damages pro-
vision solely because actual damages turn out to be inconsistent with
the agreed damages calculus. In doing so, courts circumvent the par-
ties' very purpose in crafting the provision, notwithstanding the qual-
ity of the parties' bargaining. Agreed remedies perhaps should enjoy
a presumption of enforceability to account for this propensity of
judges as well.
Judicial reformers of agreed damages law nonetheless will have to
proceed with caution. Cognitive limitations will also affect the very
judicial decision whether or not to abandon the current aggressive
policing approach to agreed damages. Judicial reformers may be
overconfident that judges like themselves will not succumb to the
hindsight bias or the framing effect. Consequently, reformers may re-
sist accounting for these phenomena in their policy decisions and
therefore remain too content with current law.12 6 Moreover, judicial
reformers may resist revising the law of agreed damages because they
remember outrageous penalty clauses better than run-of-the-mill
agreed damages provisions and therefore mistakenly believe the for-
mer occur more frequently than the latter.12 7 On the other hand,
judicial reformers reviewing previous cases with the benefit of hind-
sight may overestimate judges' and juries' ability to distinguish be-
tween fair and opportunistic bargaining of agreed damages clauses
and therefore underestimate the importance of the current tests of
agreed damages.
Perhaps of most concern, attempting to account for judges' cog-
nitive biases in prescribing the law of agreed damages may undermine
the judicial process. No decision, whether it involves agreed damages,
other contract law issues, or even general legal issues, would be safe
from the scrutiny of behavioralists. However, in its present inchoate
form, BDT may offer up too many different observations to allow for a
systematic account of cognitive psychology in judicial decision mak-
ing. At least for the foreseeable future, therefore, perhaps the parties
themselves should be accountable for their own remedial
provisions.12
8
126 See Arlen, supra note 39, at 1785.
127 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 765 (noting that "Ujudges are subject to the
availability heuristic"). In addition, judges simply may prefer the status quo.
128 See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. The parties' freedom to draft agreed
remedies provisions would of course be subject to traditional policing doctrines such as
good faith and unconscionability. See id.
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IV
CONCLUSION
I asked two questions in the introduction, one positive and the
other normative. First, does BDT help explain the special judicial
treatment of agreed damages provisions? Second, does the theory
suggest the correct judicial approach to agreed damages?
BDT does shed some light on the mystery of agreed damages. 129
Judges exuberantly police agreed damages in part because of their
perception of the planning parties' cognitive limitations. Judges be-
lieve that parties at the bargaining stage are generally too optimistic
that nothing will go wrong and therefore devote their limited bargain-
ing energies and abilities to other issues. People's aversion to penal-
ties and windfalls also undoubtedly enhances the judicial appetite for
devouring agreed damages clauses. 130 Moreover, judges probably fail
to account for their own cognitive biases, such as their tendency to
remember outrageous agreed damages clauses and to believe too opti-
mistically that they are not susceptible to the hindsight bias or the
framing effect.
Prescriptively, BDT demonstrates that many reasons for "strict
scrutiny" of agreed damages clauses may be only half right. Other
cognitive heuristics and biases suggest that, on the whole, parties may
especially value their agreed damages provision, spend lots of time
refining it, account for it when assigning other rights and duties in the
contract (such as price), and generally believe it is fair. In light of
conflicting evidence on the nature of the parties' bargaining and
given contract law's apparent focus on only part of the story, BDT
helps show the absence of a persuasive justification for special judicial
treatment of agreed damages clauses. In addition, BDT substantiates
this position by underscoring judicial decision-making foibles in this
realm. BDT's focus on the bargaining process also emphasizes the
value of rules that presume the enforceability of agreed damages
clauses in order to encourage parties to improve their decision mak-
ing by reading and studying their agreed damages provisions.
129 Professor Sunstein argues that BDT is useful in refining the economic analysis of
the law.
[I]t does not follow that people's behavior is unpredictable, systematically
irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary,
the qualifications can be described, used, and sometimes even modeled.
Those qualifications, and the resulting understandings of decision and
choice, are playing a large and mounting role in many fields within eco-
nomics and other social sciences.
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1175-76.
1o SeeJustin Sweet, Liquidated Damages in CaHfornia, 60 CA. L. REv. 84, 89 (1972) (dis-
cussing courts' employment of "nonenforcement as an equitable compromise").
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In light of these considerations and because of the contributions
of agreed damages provisions,' 13 perhaps courts should abandon the
special tests for agreed damages and simply apply traditional policing
doctrines, such as unconscionability and duress. Courts employing
this approach would strike an agreed damages provision only if they
found it "oppressive" or the product of "unfair surprise."13 2 In short,
agreed damages provisions probably should be treated like any other
contract term.
Despite BDT's obvious contribution to legal analysis, this Essay
suggests that BDT cannot resolve the mystery of liquidated damages.
Questions remain concerning whether specific cognitive processes ap-
ply in the exchange setting as well as whether, and to what extent,
they apply to both parties. Moreover, reformers relying on BDT will
remain on slippery footing precisely because particular cognitive phe-
nomena point to different explanations for and policy approaches to
the agreed damages problem. Even if coherent, BDT's role in estab-
lishing the appropriate content of law will continue to challenge re-
formers, who must determine how to deal with their own cognitive
limitations. For these reasons, until BDT develops a more coherent
approach to decision making, courts and analysts should proceed with
caution in applying it.
131 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 cmL 1 (1989).
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